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ORIGINS OF TAX LAW: THE HISTORY
OF THE PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATION
J. TIMOTHY PHILIPPS*
JAMES S. McNIDER, III**
DANIEL E. RILEY***
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of federal tax law involves an understanding of the many
factors which interact to make our law. While the primary purpose of
the tax law is to collect the money necessary to run the government, an
increasingly important collateral motivation underlying the enactment
of tax laws involves the desire to use the law as a vehicle for effectuating
certain social goals.'
In the environment of these motivating elements, taxpayers must
respond to the rules established by Congress that are interpreted in a
process involving both the administrative sector of the government and
the courts. As a consequence of the competing considerations underlying
this process of creating, interpreting and enforcing the tax laws, incon-
sistent policies sometimes become evident. Reconciliation of these incon-
sistent policies is often made by administrative or judicial compromises.2
One area of tax law that illustrates a process involving inconsistent
rules concerns the personal service corporation (PSC). This article will
review the history of the PSC and analyze its tax treatment in an at-
tempt to provide a student of tax law with a perspective into the work-
ings of the federal tax system. The topic represents a unique confluence
of fundamental substantive issues in the context of frequent legislative,
administrative, and judicial activity. The latest example of this activity
is the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), a
statute which will have a significant impact in amending many of the sec-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code) that govern the tax
treatment of PSC's.
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. B.S. 1962, Wheeling College; J.D.
1965, Georgetown University; LL.M. 1966, Harvard University.
** Associate, Kaufman and Canoles, Norfolk, Virginia; B.S. 1978, Washington and Lee
University; J.D. 1981, Washington and Lee University.
*** B.A. 1974, St. Alphonsus College; M.Ed. 1976, Edinboro State College; second year
law student, Washington and Lee University.
I One example of the use of the tax laws to achieve certain social goals is the enact-
ment of the rehabilitation tax credit with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA).
Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 212(b), 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (codified at I.R.C. § 48(g)).
See infra text at Part H (The History of the Personal Service Corporation).
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1982) (TEFRA).
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A PSC is an entity organized under the applicable state corporation
law statute, the primary activity of which is to sell the services of in-
dividuals.4 The extreme example of a PSC is one which has one person as
both the corporation's sole shareholder and its only employee.5 It is this
type of PSC upon which this article will focus.
Three areas of tax benefits are available to a service-provider who
incorporates instead of operating as a sole proprietorship. The first
benefit is the ability to shift the taxation of income from the individual
tax rates to lower corporate tax rates.' This advantage, however, only
benefits an individual who causes the PSC to retain and accumulate
some of its earnings, instead of distributing all of its income as deducti-
ble expenses.'
The second benefit available to an individual who performs services
as an employee of a PSC involves tax law provisions that establish cer-
tain fringe benefits available to "employees" but not to self-employed in-
dividuals.' Thus, in the context of a PSC, the shareholder-employee can
provide for personal expenses to be paid and deducted by his employer
and have the benefit excluded from his taxable income by virtue of his
status as an "employee."9
The third benefit of a PSC concerns timing differences in the
recognition of income. A fundamental concept in tax planning is that a
Most personal service corporations are chartered under the particular state's stock
corporation act or under the state's professional corporation act. For examples of state pro-
fessional corporation statutes, see VA. §§ 13.1-543 to -556 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 1501-1516 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 13401-13410 (West Supp. 1982).
1 The Internal Revenue Service has directed its attacks on the tax status of personal
service corporations primarily toward corporations owned by one person. A common asser-
tion of the Service is that income the corporation purportedly earns actually is earned by its
sole shareholder. In the context of corporations with two or more shareholders, the attempted
allocations of corporate income to multiple shareholders is made less frequently because an
arm's length pooling of income has occurred. See Bittker, Professional Associations and
Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. REV. 1 (1961).
' The average tax rate for a corporation's first $100,000 of income during 1982 is 26
1/4% for taxable years beginning in 1982. A single individual's average tax rate for the first
$100,000 of taxable income is approximately 41% for calendar year 1982. Under the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, both individual and corporate tax rates decreased for
taxable years beginning in 1983.
Even if a shareholder-employee causes a personal service corporation (PSC) to
distribute all of its income in deductible expenses, providing services through a corporation
nevertheless can be advantageous because the corporation can deduct certain expenses that
a self-employed individual cannot deduct. See infra note 8.
8 Benefits available to an employee but not to a self-employed individual include group
term life insurance, a medical reimbursement plan, and a $5,000 death benefit. See I.R.C.
§ 79 (life insurance); id. § 105 (medical); id. § 101 (death benefit). See also Zalutsky, Com-
parison of a Professional Corporation With an Unincorporated Practice After ERISA, 34
INST. FED. TAX'N 1355, 1356 (1976); Popkin, The Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 22
B.C.L. REV. 439 (1981).
' See Zalutsky, supra note 8, at 1356.
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taxpayer's wealth can be increased to the extent the payment of income
tax otherwise immediately payable is postponed." In a PSC, corporate
income taxes may be deferred by the judicious selection of its fiscal
year." Individual income taxes of the shareholder-employee may be
deferred with compensation arrangements whereby income earned on
behalf of the PSC is held in the corporation for a period of time before it
is distributed to the shareholder-employee. 2
Until the enactment of TEFRA, one of the most attractive aspects of
a PSC was that a shareholder-employee could defer more income tax
under a corporate employee retirement plan than an individual could
defer under a self-employed retirement plan." By 1984 TEFRA will
eliminate this gap between deductions available under corporate
employee plans and self-employed individual plans, and thereby will
decrease the prior incentive to incorporate. An understanding of this
historical differential is important, however, since it constituted the
11 See Blum, An Introduction to the Mathematics of Tax Planning, 57 TAXES 707, 708
(1979).
1 See Report of Committee on Special Problems of Executives and Professionals, Pro-
bate and Trust Division, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law (ABA), Current
Problems for Incorporated Professionals, 17 REAL PROP. & TR. J. 357, 357 (1982).
"' See Eaton, Professional Corporations and Associations in Perspective, 23 TAx L.
REV. 1, 23 (1967). The most simplistic form of income deferral between a corporation and the
corporation's shareholder-employee involves postponing the distribution of corporate in-
come earned at the beginning of the taxable year until the end of the taxable year. Another
method of deferring individual income tax on corporate distributions concerns accumulating
the corporate income during more than one corporate taxable year. The accumulated earn-
ings tax imposed under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 531, however, limits the amount of
corporate earnings that a corporation may hold.
s Before Congress enacted the Self-Employed Individual's Tax Retirement Act of
1962 (often referred to as the Keogh Bill or H.R. 10), the tax laws prohibited self-employed
individuals from deferring portions of their taxable income by contributing to a retirement
plan. Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962). The law's discriminatory treatment resulted
from the common law rule that a sole proprietor acted in his individual capacity and,
therefore, could not be an employee of himself. The enactment of the Keogh Bill, however,
did not result in equal treatment of employees and the self-employed individual. The
passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 increased the
discriminatory manner in which the Code's deferred compensation rules treated self-
employed individuals. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). See Lewis & Hevener, Attribu-
tion of Income in Personal Service Corporations, 1 VA. TAX REV. 327, 327 n.2 (1981).
Although the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 increased the contribution limits for
Keogh plans, objectionable discrimination against self-employed individuals remained after
ERTA. Lewis, Taxation of Private Pension Plans under T.E.F.R.A.: Keogh Remembered,
68 A.B.A. J. 1568, 1570 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Keogh Remembered].
Immediately before Congress enacted TEFRA, the tax law limited contributions to a
qualified defined contribution plan to the lesser of 25% of compensation or $45,475. I.R.C.
§ 415(c). Under a qualified defined benefit plan, the law limited annual benefits payable to
the lesser of 100% of compensation or $136,425 for life annually, if retirement began at age
55. I.R.C. § 415(b).
TEFRA limits annual contributions to defined contribution plans to $30,000. Under
defined benefit plans, TEFRA will limit a participant to $90,000 yearly. TEFRA § 235(a).
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primary motivation in many cases for incorporating a service provider's
business activities.14
Before discussing the history of the PSC, it is appropriate to in-
troduce certain sections of the Code, and one of the common law tax
principles thereunder, that constrain a taxpayer's ability to take advant-
age of the foregoing benefits of a PSC. Fundamental to the assessment
of tax, of course, is the existence of a taxpaying entity.' 5 Income produc-
ing activities may be performed by, among others, an individual, part-
nership, corporation, or trust. 6 Yet, depending upon the characterization
of these entities for federal income tax purposes under Code section
7701,17 the income tax attributable to these activities can vary
significantly.
Once the operating entity has been defined under federal tax law,
section 61 of the Code and the assignment of income doctrine govern the
threshold question of whether that entity earns income on which tax
may be assessed. The assignment of income doctrine often proves to be
an obstacle to an individual who would like to shift the taxability of per-
sonal service income to a PSC.'8 The assignment of income doctrine is a
common law tax principle, the statutory nexus of which is section 61,
which is founded on the premise that the "true earner" of the income is
the entity to which the income will be taxed29
The assignment of income doctrine, which has been described as
"the first principle of income taxation," was set forth in the classic
Supreme Court decision of Lucas v. Earl." In Lucas, the individual tax-
payer contracted with his wife to pay her one-half of his future
earnings.2 The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer, the true earner,
was taxable on the entire amount of his earnings, notwithstanding his
wife's prior legal claim to the one-half interest.' The Court thus
" See Appel & Harris, The Personal Service Company-A Tax Planning Tool, 31 MA-
JOR TAX PLAN. 10-1, at 10-5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Appel]; Battle, The Use of Corpora-
tions by Persons Who Perform Services to Gain Tax Advantages, 57 TAXES 797, 798 (1979).
" Treasury Regulation § 301.7701 contains the rules for classification of organizations
for tax purposes. Although state law defines the legal attributes of any particular organiza-
tion, federal tax law establishes the classes into which organizations fall for purposes of
federal taxation. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553, 554. See generally B.
BITTKER, 3 FED. TAX'N INCOME, EST. & GIFTS 90.1 (1981).
11 See generally Freeman, Combining the Use of Corporations, Partnerships, and
Trusts to Minimize the Income and Transfer Tax Impact on Family Businesses and In-
vestments, 57 TAXES 857 (1979).
" See supra note 15.
" See, e.g., American Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828 (1971), acq. on other
issues, 1972-2 C.B. 1.
," Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See generally Brown, The Growing "Common
Law" of Taxation, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 235 (1961).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 113-14.
' Id. at 114-15.
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established the common law attribution-of-income rule which would prove
troublesome for taxpayers utilizing PSC's.'
Section 482 embodies concepts analogous to the assignment of in-
come doctrine. Section 482 provides that the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) may apportion income between commonly controlled trades or
businesses if apportionment is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of each of these entities.24 Determining
whether, under section 482, income is clearly reflected between two en-
tities or individuals involves many of the same considerations as identi-
fying the "true earner" of income under section 61 and the assignment of
income doctrine.' Because of the similar concepts under section 482 and
the assignment of income doctrine, both typically are asserted by the
IRS when it attacks taxpayers' income shifting.28
Other Code sections which the IRS has applied to taxpayers' at-
tempts to avail themselves of the tax planning possibilities of PSC's are
sections 269 and 531.1 Section 269 provides that the Secretary of the
Treasury may disallow any deduction or credit if a taxpayer acquired
direct or indirect control of a corporation for the primary purpose of
securing the benefit of such deduction or credit.' Since many PSC's have
been formed to permit their shareholder-employees to obtain the benefit
of deductions for contributions to retirement plans,' section 269 poten-
tially could apply to a PSC depending on the specific circumstances in-
volved.
Section 531 imposes a penalty tax on a corporation's accumulation of
earnings and profits beyond those reasonably needed for the corpora-
tion's business." The Code, however, establishes that the corporation
23 Id.
24 I.R.C. § 482. Section 482 provides that:
[In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits,
or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades, or businesses.
Id.
An allocation by the Commissioner under § 482 will not be set aside unless clearly
shown to be unreasonable, capricious, and arbitrary. See Ballentine Motor Co., Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 321 F.2d 796, 800 (4th Cir. 1963).
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 95-128.
26 See, e.g., Achiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881 (1981).
2 See, e.g., Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
I.R.C. § 269.
See Appel, supra note 14, at 10-5.
I.R.C. § 531. See generally Cunningham, More Than You Ever Wanted To Know
About The Accumulated Earnings Tax, 6 J. CORP. TAX'N 187 (1979).
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may safely accumulate $250,000 of earnings and profits in corporations
other than certain service corporations."1 For corporations whose prin-
cipal function is the performance of services in certain professional
fields, section 535 provides that the corporation may accumulate only
$150,000 before such corporations must rely on the firm's reasonable
business needs to accumulate more earnings and profits.2
II. THE HISTORY OF THE PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATION
The history of the PSC can be instructive to students of tax law
because it illustrates the process by which tax law is made. In the
simplest view of the process, tax law is made when Congress enacts
statutes to be codified in the Internal Revenue Code,33 the Treasury
Department then promulgates regulations, the IRS issues rulings, and
courts interpret all of the foregoing.34 All of these factors naturally are
reflected in the history of the PSC. What makes the PSC a rewarding
area of study, however, is that the issues surrounding a PSC contain a
high concentration of the many statutory and common law concepts
necessary for the practice of tax law. 5 Moreover, these fundamental con-
cepts operate in the context of an ongoing struggle between the Service
and taxpayers determined to ascertain the limits of legitimate tax
avoidance.
3 1
The legal dilemma of whether to tax a PSC on income earned on the
activities of its sole shareholder-employee has arisen largely because
corporate retirement plans before TEFRA were more attractive than
retirement plans available for self-employed individuals.3 1 It is a com-
s' I.R.C. § 535(c)(2).
Id. The minimum accumulated earnings credit allowable for purposes of offsetting
accumulated taxable income under I.R.C. § 535 is $150,000 "in the case of a corporation, the
principal function of which is the performance of services in the field of health, law,
engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, or consulting."
" Not all tax law, however, is codified in the Internal Revenue Code. Congress instead
enjoys the alternative of enacting provisions that affect a narrow class of taxpayers and
records this enactment only in the Statutes at Large. See Note, Tax Equity andAdHoc Tax
Legislation, 84 HARV. L. REV. 640, 641 (1971). See generally Surrey, The Congress and the
Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1957);
Cary, Pressure Groups in the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uni-
formity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1955).
See generally M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1981).
One commentator has stated that the Treasury's handling of professional corpora-
tions since the 1930s is a classic instance of the cumulative reverberation of mistakes. See
Eaton, supra note 12, at 1. The attractiveness of the history of the personal service corpora-
tion as a case study in federal tax law is attributable not only to the Treasury's less than
artful handling of PSC's. The strategy of taxpayers when faced with administrative rule-
making and courts' responses thereto is an integral part of this case study.
1 Tax avoidance schemes may exact a heavy price under TEFRA's new compliance
provisions, to the extent the IRS successfully attacks them. See Roth, New Penalty Provis-
ions and Their Effect On Aggressive Tax Planning, 61 TAXES 52 (1983).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 13 & 14.
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mentary on our tax system that this unnecessary distinction created a
tremendous incentive to incorporate which, in turn, generated a large
amount of litigation when the IRS began to contest this practice.
The reasons for the employee/self-employed distinction are obscure.
Indeed, it may be that there was no reason why such a distinction was
made when corporate retirement plans were permitted in the Revenue
Act of 1921.38 The rationale of provisions in the Revenue Act of 1921 con-
tinuing tax-favored treatment to corporate pension plans was "the
desire to improve the welfare of employees by encouraging the
establishment of trusts for their benefit."39 Yet, Congress apparently
gave little thought originally to extending the benefits to the self-
employed.
Representative Keogh, the primary advocate for enactment of the
present day retirement plan provisions for the self-employed, believed
the original omission of self-employed individuals was inadvertent." The
lack of parity after enactment of Keogh's self-employed retirement plan,
however, was the result of a deliberate political maneuver by Represen-
tative Keogh. Keogh put forth a discriminatory proposal for self-
employed retirement plans that avoided parity with the corporate plan
deductions because he believed that the limited nature of the tax break
would enhance its chances of passage." When Congress first enacted the
employee retirement provisions in the early 1920s, few could have fore-
seen that by the 1970s the favorable treatment of employees would
spawn enactment of professional corporation or association statutes in
all the states and the District of Columbia.2
In the face of the desirability of shifting business activities to en-
tities taxed as corporations, the IRS challenged this practice on two
levels. The Service attempted to treat common law associations of pro-
fessionals, such as doctors, as partnerships instead of corporations for
tax purposes 3 In the years before state legislatures enacted profes-
sional corporation statutes, professionals formed "associations" in lieu of
corporations because of the ethical and legal requirements that pro-
hibited them from incorporating their practices." With respect to in-
dividuals who legally could operate within the corporate cloak, the IRS
" See Keogh, Pensions for the Self-Employed, 100 TR. & EST. 175, 175 (1961).
*2 See Rice, Employee Trusts Under the Revenue Act of 1942, 20 TAXES 721 (1942).
40 See Keogh, supra note 38, at 175.
" See Voluntary Pension Plans by Self-Employed Individuals, 1961: Hearings on H.R.
10 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 117, 125 (1961) (statement
of Hon. Eugene J. Keogh, Representative in Congress from the State of New York).
42 Mullane & Williams, Professional Organizations-General Coverage, TAX MGMT.
(BNA) No. 227, A-1 (1970).
"3 See, e.g., United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
" States typically would not allow professionals such as physicians and attorneys to
practice as employees of corporations. Moreover, ethical considerations such as the rule
against fee-splitting presented an obstacle to groups of professionals who, if they practice in
a corporation, would by definition pool their income. See Eaton, supra note 12, at 25, 26.
19831
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attacked this practice by invoking the assignment of income doctrine
and section 482.45
The early tax law recognized that PSC's represented a special situa-
tion. The Revenue Act of 1918 contained a special definition of personal
service corporations and taxed them as partnerships.4 6 The definition
presciently anticipated problems which would subsequently arise con-
cerning attempts by service-providers to assign their earnings to their
PSC's. A personal service corporation was defined in the 1918 Revenue
Act as "[a] corporation whose income is to be ascribed primarily to the
activities of the principal owners or stockholders, who are themselves
regularly engaged in the active conduct of the affairs of the corporation,
and in which capital (whether invested or borrowed) is not a material
income-producing factor. ... "'I
The Revenue Act of 1921 eliminated the special statutory treatment
of personal service corporations, except for the purpose of applying the
excess profits tax.48 Thereafter, a PSC was taxed as a corporation. Con-
troversy, however, existed as to the proper definition of an "association"
for federal income tax purposes. In 1935, the Supreme Court in Mor-
rissey v. Commissioner" established the criteria for determining
whether an unincorporated entity should be taxed on its income as an
association. In Morrissey, the Court established the "resemblance test"
for distinguishing an association from a trust or partnership for federal
income tax purposes?1 Under this test, an unincorporated business
group would be taxed as a corporation if the group exhibited the formal
characteristics of a "corporation" under state law.51 These indicia of a
corporation included limited liability, centralized management, free
transferability of interests, and continuity of life of the enterprise. 52
The year after Morrissey was handed down, the IRS published its
position that the service would apply the resemblance test on a nation-
wide basis.5 In an attempt to enlarge its tax base during the Depression,
the government was trying to force association status on organizations
such as business trusts and limited partnerships. 4 The incentive to tax
income under the more burdensome corporate rate structure, however,
ended in the early 1940s.
" See, e.g., Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), affd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966) (§ 482 case); American Say. Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828
(1971), acq. on other issues, 1972-2 C.B. 1.
11 Revenue Act of 1918, § 200, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 300.
47 Id.
41 See Eaton, supra note 12, at 2.
11 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
s Id.
5' Id. at 356-60.
5 Id. Also considered as indicia of a corporation under Morrissey were the existence of
associates and carrying on a business enterprise for profit. Id. at 356-59.
See Mim. 4483, XV-2 Cum. Bull. 175 (1936); Eaton, supra note 12, at 5.
5, See Eaton, supra note 12, at 5; Mullane & Williams, supra note 42, at A-5.
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The advent of steeply progressive individual income tax rates under
the Revenue Act of 1942 created the opposite incentive to incorporate. 55
The availability of corporate retirement plans only increased the attrac-
tiveness of operating in corporate form.56 Unfortunately for the IRS, the
government had recently been successful in Pelton v. Commissioner,7
where the Service asserted that a medical clinic with three physicians
doing business under a trust form was actually an association which
should be taxed as a corporation.5 8 The Service subsequently was sad-
dled with the Pelton decision when it revised its position in the 1950s
and began to assert that associations of professionals could not be taxed
as corporations. 9
In the face of Pelton, the government lost in United States v. Kint-
net 60 when the Service argued that a Montana common law association of
physicians could not adopt a pension plan.6 1 Undaunted by the Kintner
defeat, the IRS asserted in Revenue Ruling 56-2362 that a group of doc-
tors who adopt the form of an association in order to obtain the benefits
of a corporate pension plan should be taxed as a partnership.
The following year, the IRS revoked Revenue Ruling 56-23,5 but the
Treasury in 1960 adopted regulations that administratively would over-
rule the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Kintner.4 These regulations,
aptly referred to as the Kinter regulations, effectively precluded part-
nerships and unincorporated business groups from being taxed as cor-
porations."' Stung by the Service's unvarnished attempt at legislation by
administrative edict, professionals caused state legislatures to enact
statutes authorizing professionals to incorporate.6 By 1970, forty-nine
states had statutes permitting professional corporations or
associations. 7 Currently, all states and the District of Columbia have one
of these statutes in force. 6
The move by the states to enact professional corporation statutes
prompted the Service to respond with new regulations in 1965 which
55 See Eaton, supra note 12, at 5; Mullane & Williams, supra note 42, at A-5.
5 Id.
" 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
Id. at 475.
s See Eaton, supra note 12, at 6.
216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
Id. at 421.
62 Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 C.B. 598, revoked, Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B. 886.
Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B. 886.
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960).
See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 2-15 (1979); Scallen,
Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REv.
603, 641 (1964-65).
See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 65, at 2-20; Scallen, supra note 65, at 605.
See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 65, at 2-20.
See Mullane & Williams, supra note 42, at A-1.
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made it practically impossible for a professional corporation to attain
corporate status for federal tax purposes." The government subsequently
lost several attempts to uphold the validity of these regulations." The
Service ultimately abandoned its position in 1970 when the Service finally
conceded that professional corporations and associations could be taxed
as corporations."
Although the Treasury was unsuccessful in attacking the PSC in the
regulations by using a restrictive definition of a corporation for federal
tax purposes, the Service has had some success employing the assign-
ment of income doctrine and section 482 to undercut taxpayers' efforts
to shift personal service income into a corporation. Unfortunately, in the
reported PSC cases in which courts have applied the assignment of in-
come doctrine or section 482, the courts have failed to agree whether the
common law assignment of income doctrine established under section 61
or the purely statutory section 482 rule should apply to reallocate per-
sonal services income in appropriate circumstances.72 The confusion over
the priority between the assignment of income doctrine and section 482
is a result of two inconsistent premises in tax law which collide at the
point of the one-person PSC.
The first premise concerns the principle that an individual must be
taxed on the income that person earned.73 The integrity of the pro-
gressive tax rate structure depends on the maintenance of this premise,
since otherwise it would be possible to split earned income among
related parties at will. The second premise involves the recognition of
the corporation as an entity that can earn its own income through the ac-
tivities of its agents.74 When a corporation's only agent is its only
shareholder, an obvious conflict exists and one premise must be subor-
dinated to the other.
The following cases demonstrate a progression in the logic of the
courts. The early PSC cases based their decisions largely on the common
law assignment of income doctrine. 75 As will be seen, the recent PSC
69 Eaton & Maycock, Final Professional Corporation Regs are an Improvement-But
Not Much, 22 J. TAX'N 208, 209 (1965).
70 See Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); O'Neill v. United States,
410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
" Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 C.B. 278.
72 Compare American Say. Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828 (1971) (assignment of in-
come doctrine applied) with Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970) (§ 482 ap-
plied).
" See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
74 See Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1970). See generally Clark,
The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evoliotion and Reform, 87
YALE L. J. 90, 97-100 (1977).
71 The contractual arrangements between a PSC and its shareholder-employee also
have been held to govern attribution of income issues in PSC cases. See, e.g., Fox v. Com-
missioner, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938). In determining the person or entity to which certain income
will be taxed, contracts may constitute evidence pointing to the entity that actually earns
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cases have preferred, under certain circumstances, to employ section
482 to attribute income to shareholder-employees.7" The utilization of
section 482 in these recent cases reflects the manner in which courts at-
tempt to harmonize conceptually inconsistent rules.
The earliest case to arise in the PSC area was Fox v. Commissioner."
The taxpayer there, Fontaine Fox, was a cartoonist and originator of the
Toonerville Trolley comic strip. Fox caused to be organized an almost
wholly owned corporation, the Reynard Corporation (Reynard), which
then entered into an employment agreement with Fox.78 Under the em-
ployment contract, Fox transferred his copyrights to Reynard and
agreed to render to Reynard his exclusive services as a cartoonist for a
specified period of time. Reynard subsequently entered into a contract
with a third party, Bell, for syndication of the cartoons. Reynard paid
Fox a salary of $2,500 per month under this arrangement. The contract
between Reynard and Bell provided that Bell would pay Reynard
amounts far in excess of the monthy $2,500 Reynard paid Fox. For the
year in dispute Bell paid Reynard well over $100,000 while Reynard paid
Fox a salary of $30,000.78
The Commissioner argued that all the income Reynard received
should be taxed to Fox. The Commissioner based this contention on the
alternative grounds that (1) the corporation was a mere dummy whose
the income. Taxpayers often argue that they earn income only from their controlled PSC
because their employment contract requires them to render their services exclusively to
the PSC. Recent cases, however, have disregarded either the contractual arrangements, or
the lack of them, in resolving whether a certain taxpayer earns his income from his PSC or
a third party. See, e.g., Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980) (actual per-
formance of services exclusively for PSC more meaningful than contract with controlled cor-
poration); cf. Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882, 893 n.21 (1982) (employment contracts
do not necessarily determine true earner of income).
Closely related to the issue of whether contract rights may establish the true earner of
income is the issue of whether personal service income may be taxed to a PSC after its
shareholder-employee assigns a pre-existing employment contract to that entity. Normally,
a transfer of "property" (e.g., a contract) will change the person to whom the property's in-
come will be taxed. In the area of personal service contracts, however, this rule that income
from property is taxed to the property's owner typically does not supercede the common
law requirement that the true earner of income must pay the income tax thereon. But see
McGee v. Commissioner, 81-1 U.S.T.C. 9184 (D.C. Neb. 1980) (transfer of physician's ser-
vice contract to controlled corporation transfers taxability of income under contract to cor-
poration). Where a person is obligated to work under a personal service contract but has not
performed yet, a better chance exists to shift the tax attributable to the contract proceeds
than if that person had performed before the contract was assigned.
"' See, e.g., Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980).
" 77 B.T.A. 271 (1938).
"' Id. at 272. Fox owned 98 shares of the 100 authorized shares of Reynard stock. The
corporation issued the remaining two shares to Fox's attorney and his brother, apparently
to qualify them as directors. Id.
I Id. at 275-76. While Fox's motivations are not entirely clear from the facts, the
discrepancy between Reynard's earnings and Fox's salary indicates that at leist part of
Fox's motivation was to shift part of his individual income to Reynard.
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separate existence the court should therefore disregard, and (2) Fox
made an invalid anticipatory assignment of income."0 The Board of Tax
Appeals rejected both these arguments. First, quoting the Supreme
Court in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,8" the Board found Reynard
had a separate, independent existence for federal tax purposes."2 The
Board based this finding on several facts which indicated that proper
corporate formalities had been followed, that Fox had an exclusive
employment contract with Reynard, and that Bell entered into a con-
tract with Reynard and Fox. Reynard also carried out other business
transactions in Reynard's name and Reynard filed income tax returns.
The Board summarily disposed of the assignment of income contention,
saying that no contractual relationship existed between Fox and Bell
and, therefore, Fox had no income rights to assign.
8 3
The next major case was Laughton v. Commission,84 which involved
a corporation (Industries) established for the motion picture actor
Charles Laughton. Although Laughton was the beneficial owner of all In-
dustries' outstanding stock, Laughton did not actively participate in the
management of this company and was not a member of the board of
directors. In an employment contract, Laughton agreed to devote his
services exclusively to Industries.85 At this time Laughton had an
outstanding contractual obligation to make three pictures for an English
film company. Laughton assigned the profits from that contract to In-
dustries, and transferred his right to ten percent of the gross receipts
from the motion picture "The Private Life of Henry VIII" to Industries.
Subsequently, Laughton also caused a contract between himself and
Paramount Studios to be cancelled. Simultaneously with this cancella-
tion, Industries entered into a contract with Paramount for the services
of Laughton. Laughton personally guaranteed that Industries would per-
form according to the terms of the Industries-Paramount contract.
8
The Commissioner in Laughton contended that the Service could
disregard the corporate form on the ground that Laughton organized In-
dustries as a mere tax avoidance scheme. The Commissioner further
argued that the arrangements between Laughton and Industries were
anticipatory assignments of income. The Board of Tax Appeals determin-
ed that the issue was "whether the corporation should be recognized or
disregarded as an entity separate and apart from the petitioner."' The
Board upheld the corporation's separate status for tax purposes saying
Id. at 276-77.
81 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
37 B.T.A. at 276-77.
Id. at 277-78.
40 B.T.A. 101 (1939), nonacq., 1939-2 C.B. 56, remanded, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940).





that Industries was a separate business organization operated by per-
sons other than Laughton and created for valid business purposes. Fur-
ther, the Board rejected the Commissioner's assignment of income argu-
ment that the corporation, not Laughton, had earned the income, despite
the fact that Laughton personally guaranteed the performance of his
services under the contract between Industries and the studio.
On appeal,' the Ninth Circuit remanded Laughton to the Tax Court
to determine whether Laughton's hiring of himself to Industries for a
salary substantially less than the compensation for which Industries sup-
plied Laughton's services as Industries' employee "constituted, in effect,
a single transaction by Laughton in which he received indirectly- the
larger sum paid by the producers."89 The Ninth Circuit's remand was
based upon the fact that the Supreme Court, subsequent to the Board of
Tax Appeals decision, decided the case of Higgins v. Smith,1 which
disregarded the existence of a wholly owned corporation by disallowing
a loss on a sale between the corporation and its sole shareholder." Unfor-
tunately, there is no report of the Laughton decision on remand.2
The next flurry of activity in the PSC area began with Borge v. Com-
missioner.3 Victor Borge, a well-known professional entertainer,
operated for several years a separate poultry-raising business as a sole
proprietorship. Borge's poultry business had consistently shown losses
which Borge used to offset his entertainment business income. When the
hobby loss provision of former section 270 threatened Borge, he was ad-
vised to transfer the poultry business to his newly formed, wholly owned
corporation (Danica). Borge contracted with Danica to perform entertain-
ment and promotional services for Danica over a five-year period. The
contract set compensation at $50,000 per year. Danica then offset the
poultry losses against the company's entertainment profits, which
profits far exceeded the $50,000 a year Danica had contracted to pay
Borge 4 The court found as a fact that Borge would not have entered
into such a contract with an unrelated party. 5 The court, therefore,
upheld the Commissioner's allocation under section 48296 of a portion of
the entertainment business profits to Borge. The Borge court was in-
fluenced by the facts that: (1) Danica had done nothing to further the
entertainment business, (2) third parties who contracted with Danica for
Commissioner v. Laughton, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940).
Id. at 104.
308 U.S. 473 (1940).
Id. at 477-78
'3 Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions
and Comments, 17 TAx L. REV. 1, 5 n.8 (1961).
3 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), affg, T.C.M. (P-H) 67,173 (1967), cerL denied, 395 U.S.
933 (1969).
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Borge's services required Borge's personal guarantee on the contract,
and (3) Danica underpaid Borge's stipulated salary. 7
Borge represented a fundamentaly new judicial treatment of a PSC.
Borge appears to be the first case in which the IRS allocated purely per-
sonal service business income to the service-provider solely under sec-
tion 482 principles. 8 Despite the court's attention to the formalities of
Borge's arrangements with the corporation, the determinative factor in
Borge was that the court believed that Borge formed and operated the
corporation as a tax avoidance device. The court made a specific finding
under section 269 that "Danica was incorporated with the purpose of
evading or avoiding federal income taxes."99
The next significant decision, Rubin v. Commissioner,"' constituted
a quantum leap in the Tax Court's approach to the PSC. Rubin, the tax-
payer, controlled a manufacturing corporation (Dorman). Along with his
brothers, Rubin set up a management company (Park). Rubin owned
seventy percent of Park and his brothers owned thirty percent. The
management company also engaged in an art business. Park entered into
a contract with Dorman under which Park would manage Dorman for
four years at an agreed compensation, with the understanding that
Rubin would personally perform the management services. Rubin signed
the contract as president of Park, although at the time Rubin signed the
contract Park was not yet incorporated. Rubin apparently did not enter
into any employment contract with Park. During the time the manage-
ment contract was in effect, Rubin also performed services for some
other business entities. Rubin generally recognized the separate ex-
istence of Park in its dealings with Dorman, but did not do so with out-
side parties."'
The Commissioner, relying on both section 61 and section 482,
allocated to Rubin as an individual the management fees which Dorman
paid to Park for the management services."2 The Tax Court found that
the Commissioner was correct on several grounds. The first ground was
simply substance versus form. Although the court refused to deny the
validity of Park for tax purposes, the court recognized a distinction be-
"¢ Id. at 675. In the Tax Court, the Commissioner had relied upon both §§ 61 and 482.
Both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit in Borge, however, premised their decisions on
§ 482 and ignored § 61.
" But cf. Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.) (mer-
chandising operation rather than purely personal service business), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
899 (1966).
" 405 F.2d at 678. Borge's tax avoidance maneuvers succeeded partially since the ser-
vice reallocated only a portion of the entertainment business income to him under § 482.
The Commissioner had allocated only that portion and had not asked the court for more.
The court found the Commissioner's allocation "indeed, generous." Id. at 677.
"' 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rev'd, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971),
aff'd, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).




tween attacking the corporation's validity and attacking the validity of
purported transactions into which the corporation entered. 3 The Rubin
court reasoned that since Rubin controlled both Dorman and Park, there
was no business purpose in the form used by Rubin. 4
The Tax Court then offered an alternate but "perhaps only seman-
tically different" rationale. It said it would have reached the same result
applying the assignment of income doctrine.' Citing a classic law review
article,0 6 the court asserted that the issue of identifying the appropriate
taxpayer turned on the question of who controlled the earning of the in-
come."' The Tax Court found that Rubin "clearly directed and controlled
the earning of the income" because (1) Rubin himself negotiated the
management services contract before Park was incorporated, (2) Rubin
performed services for other business entities after Park was incor-
porated, and (3) Rubin terminated the contract without consultation with
or consideration to Park.'
The Rubin court distinguished Laughton and Fox on the ground that
the taxpayers in Laughton and Fox were contractually bound to render
services exclusively to the corporation."°' Rubin, on the other hand, re-
mained free to (and actually did) engage in other work."0 Rubin's failure
to dedicate his services completely to Park influenced the court because
it indicated that Rubin, and not Park, controlled the earning of income in
question."' Thus,-the Tax Court in Rubin seemed to require an exclusive
services contract between the taxpayer and the corporation. The Rubin
court also indicated that the taxpayer should not control both the
service-provider and the recipient of the service."'
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded."' The Second
Circuit recognized that loan-out situations create a tension between two
competing policies of tax law: the recognition of the corporate form on
the one hand, and the principle of a graduated tax rate on the other."'
Judge Friendly declared that the Tax Court's inquiry as to the true
earner of income merely restated the issue. According to Judge Friendly,
resort to common law doctrine of taxation and the broad application of
section 61 only occasionally proves useful, and then only when tax
avoidance motives not susceptible to other safeguards heavily freight
103 Id.
' Id. at 265.
105 Id.
" Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G.
Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REv. 295 (1962).
"3 51 T.C. at 265-66.
106 Id. at 266.
"3 Id. at 266-67.
" Id. at 267.
"' Id.
112 Id.
Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970).
" Id. at 652.
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the transaction."' The Second Circuit held that where a statutory provi-
sion adequately deals with the problem, drastic remedies have no
place."6 Therefore, section 482 of the Code was clearly superior to the
"blunt tool" the Tax Court employed, since section 482 provided greater
flexibility than the all-or-nothing approach of section 61.11 The Second
Circuit remanded Rubin for consideration of the Commissioner's claim
under section 482.118
On remand, the Tax Court again decided against Rubin."' The facts
the Tax Court used to support its prior holding under section 61 also
established the basis for an allocation under section 482."' Thus, although
Judge Friendly criticized the use of section 61 in determining Rubin's
tax liability, the Tax Court on remand based its decision on the same
fundamental substance-over-form principles."' This time, however, the
Tax Court used the rubric of section 482 rather than section 61.
Rubin set a new judicial course that eventually placed primary em-
phasis on section 482. During this period of transition, however, the Tax
Court appeared to waver between relying on section 61 and making
reallocations under section 482. In some cases, section 61 and the assign-
ment of income doctrine provided the sole ground for the results; in
other cases section 482 was determinative; while in still others the court
relied on both assignment of income and section 482."'
" Id. at 653.
116 Id.
117 Id.
... Id. at 654.
"' Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir.
1972).
,2o Id. at 1162.
121 Id. Using § 482, the Rubin court allocated a somewhat smaller portion of the cor-
poration's income to Rubin than the court would have allocated to Rubin under § 61. Under
§ 61 the Tax Court upheld a reallocation to Rubin of $25,000 in income and $17,000 in ex-
penses for 1960 and $59,000 in income and $17,000 in expenses in 1961. On remand the Tax
Court charged Rubin with net income of $4,400 and $23,500 for the years 1960 and 1961
respectively. Id. at 1164.
1" See, e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066 (1975); Gettler v. Commissioner,
T.C.M. (CCH) 442 (1975); Jordan v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 872 (1973); Estate of Cole v.
Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 73,074 (1973); American Say. Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.
828 (1971); Roubik v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 365 (1969). In American Savings Bank the court
relied solely on the assignment of income doctrine, both parties having expressly disclaimed
application of § 482. The American Savings Bank paid fees to the PSC of two members of
the bank's board of directors. The Tax Court attributed these fees to the income of the
shareholder-employees, since the shareholders exercised control over both the PSC and the
corporation receiving the service. The court allocated the income to the shareholder-
employees even though the court expressly found that the PSC was a valid corporate entity.
The American Savings Bank court invoked § 61 and assignment of income principles, and
found that the shareholder-employees actually owned and controlled the income. The court
distinguished Fox and Laughton since the shareholder-employees did not work exclusively
for the PSC, the shareholder-employees controlled both the PSC and the recipient corpora-
tion, and the shareholder-employees failed to show that the PSC employed the shareholder-
employees or that the shareholder-employees acted as the PSC's agents. 56 T.C. at 841.
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By the end of the 1970s, the courts obviously still had failed to form a
completely satisfying doctrinal basis for dealing with the PSC dilemma
of respecting the existence of the corporate entity while simultaneously
Perhaps the most important fact that the court considered was that the PSC never paid the
individual shareholder-employees any compensation for their services. Id. at 842.
Roubik also turned solely on § 61 and the assignment of income doctrine. In Roubik,
several doctors formed a PSC. The court defined the issue as whether the corporation ac-
tually carried on the doctors' business or whether the doctors carried on their business out-
side the organization. The professional service corporation in Roubik never arranged to pro-
vide its employees' services to any of the institutions for which the doctors provided ser-
vice. The court found that the relationship between the doctors and their patients was an in-
herently personal relationship, and expressed doubt that a professional service corporation
could interfere with such relationships. 53 T.C. at 379. More importantly, the taxpayers failed
to treat the corporation as a corporation. The doctors largely ignored the corporate form,
followed few corporate formalities, and in the words of Judge Tannenwald's concurring
opinion, failed to "put flesh on the bones of the corporate skeleton." Id. at 382. Courts and
commentators have largely dismissed Roubik as representing no more enlightening a princi-
ple than that a taxpayer must follow the requisite formalities to obtain recognition of the
corporate status. However, Roubik also manifested the Tax Court's greater willingness to
question the validity of a PSC than previously manifested in Fox and Laughton.
In Jordan, the Tax Court rested its decision not on § 61 and the assignment of income
doctrine but rather on § 482. The court rested its decision on grounds similar to the grounds
the Roubik court invoked to allocate income under the assignment of income doctrine. The
court found overwhelming evidence that the PSC had no control over the taxpayer's respon-
sibility to perform services for which the PSC received income. 60 T.C. at 883. The court also
noted that the evidence proved that the taxpayer performed services and received commis-
sions with little regard to the existence of the PSC. Id. The Roubik court earlier gave
similar reasons for applying § 61 and the assignment of income doctrine.
In Jones, a court stenographer formed a PSC. The Jones court refused to attribute to
the PSC the income generated when the PSC purportedly contracted out the stenography
services of the stenographer, its principal shareholder. The court reasoned that the
stenographer could not legally delegate stenographic services, and that the corporation car-
ried out precisely the identical functions the stenographer previously performed. Of course,
most, if not all, solely owned PSC's carry out functions identical to the functions the in-
dividual taxpayer previously performed. The Jones court made a feeble attempt to
distinguish Fox on the ground the taxpayer in Fox had an employment contract with the
PSC, and the PSC contracted with the third parties receiving the taxpayer's services.
One notable taxpayer victory during this period was Gettler. In Gettler, two lawyers
and a labor relations specialist formed a PSC to perform labor relations services. The Get-
tler court rejected the Commissioner's attempt to allocate income from the PSC to the in-
dividuals under either § 61 or § 482. The court supported its decision with several factors
concerning observance of corporate formalities. For instance, the corporation maintained
separate books, kept its funds in separate bank accounts, used its own letterhead, and paid
small annual dividends. Aside from these formalities, however, the corporation's existence
was ephemeral, since the corporation's office was the office of the taxpayers' law partner-
ship, the corporation paid the law partnership only $720 a year for rent and for secretarial
and accounting services, and the corporation had only three clients, two of whom were
substantial clients of the law partnership. However, and perhaps most important, the court
found a valid business purpose for the arrangement.
Another taxpayer victory was Estate of Cole. Cole, a well-known entertainer, made
several loan-out arrangements through a series of trusts and corporations. The court refused
to apply either § 61 or § 482 to allocate income from the corporation to Cole. Cole involved
incredibly complicated and perhaps unique facts and the court handed down a memorandum
decision. The decision's precedential value, therefore, is limited.
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protecting the integrity of the progressive tax rates. The disparity in
pension treatment between employees and self-employed individuals by
the 1970s led to a situation where individual taxpayers incorporated
themselves in the hope of shifting their income to their controlled cor-
porations. While the courts responded in diverse ways to this shifting of
income, a halting movement toward judicial dependence on section 482
to police the area occurred.
Foglesong v. Commissioner'3 seemed to confirm this judicial
movement towards using section 482 to address the assignment of in-
come to PSC's. Foglesong, a sales representative rendering services to
two steel tubing companies, organized Frederick H. Foglesong, Inc.
(FHF, Inc.) in which he was the controlling shareholder and sole
employee. Foglesong contributed one hundred percent of the initial
capital to FHF, Inc. and received ninety-eight percent of its common
stock. FHF, Inc. issued the remaining two percent of the common stock
to Foglesong's wife and to his accountant. FHF, Inc. issued all of its
preferred stock to Foglesong's four children. During the first four years
of FHF, Inc.'s existence, the corporation paid no dividends on the com-
mon stock but paid dividends in excess of $30,000 on the preferred stock.
FHF, Inc. employed Foglesong to do the same sales work he had
previously done in his individual capacity. After incorporation and at
Foglesong's request, the companies for which he was sales represen-
tative sent his commissions to FHF, Inc. None of the companies executed
written agreements with FHF, Inc., nor did a written employment con-
tract exist between Foglesong and FHF, Inc."4 In the Tax Court, the Ser-
vice successfully argued that Foglesong in reality earned ninety-eight
percent of the income FHF, Inc. purportedly earned. Accordingly, under
the authority of section 61 and the assignment of income doctrine, the in-
come was taxed to Foglesong.25
The Seventh Circuit, following the lead of Judge Friendly in Rubin,
reversed the Tax Court.2 ' The Seventh Circuit held that application of
assignment of income principles in this context effectively disregarded
the corporate existence. The circuit court opinion explained that in light
of Moline Properties,' absent more extreme facts than appeared in
Foglesong, the court could not use the assignment of income doctrine to
achieve essentially the same results as the court would achieve by
treating the corporation as a sham for tax purposes.'28
123 T.C.M. (P-H) 76,294 (1976), rev'd, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C.
1102 (1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
' T.C.M. (P-H) 76,294, at 76-1287 to -1289.
" Id. at 76-1289.
" See Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980).
, Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943) (corporation a viable taxable
entity so long as the purpose for its creation is the equivalent of business activity or its
creation is followed by carrying on of business by the corporation).
12 621 F.2d at 869.
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The court found that the absence of a written employment contract
between the taxpayer and his corporation was immaterial. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that Foglesong had in fact worked exclusively for the
corporation, and that Foglesong's arrangement with the corporation was
more significant than the lack of a written agreement.'29 The court
pointed out that in any situation where a sole shareholder-employee con-
tracts with his corporation, the individual can terminate his services by
simply rescinding the contract in his capacity as a corporate officer.
Foglesong's use of section 482 was premised on the court's view that sec-
tion 482 was a more precise tool than section 61 and the assignment of in-
come doctrine. While the Seventh Circuit asserted that the taxpayer
engaged in "very aggressive tax avoidance measures" which appear to
be vulnerable, the court insisted "there is no need to crack walnuts with
a sledgehammer.""13
On remand to the Tax Court, 3 ' Foglesong argued that the court
could not apply section 482 to him, because he was a mere corporate
employee and not an organization, trade, or business as required by sec-
tion 482. The Tax Court explicitly dismissed the taxpayer's contention"'
and then applied an arm's length standard to determine whether or not
the court should allocate the corporation's income to Foglesong under
section 482."' The Foglesong court defined the section 482 determination
standard as the extent to which the total compensation that FHF, Inc.
paid Foglesong exceeded the amount Foglesong would have earned ab-
sent incorporation. The Tax Court found that Foglesong received com-
pensation far below what he would have received in an arm's length
transaction." Therefore, the court refused to tax Foglesong for the in-
come. Section 482 thus yielded the same result as the assignment of in-
come doctrine. Significantly, the Tax Court in Foglesong specifically
stated that it did not intend to discourage PSC's where one of the pur-
poses for incorporating was to take advantage of tax law benefits such
as medical reimbursement plans, death benefits, and retirement plans."'
"' Id. at 872.
" Id. at 872-73.
131 77 T.C. 1102 (1981).
"3Id. at 1104.
"' Id. at 1105.
13 Id. at 1106.
"3 On taxpayer's appeal of the remand, a different panel of the Seventh Circuit surpris-
ingly held that § 482 was unavailable to reallocate income between Foglesong and his PSC.
Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982). The court rejected the Tax Court
position that being an employee of one's own PSC constitutes a trade or business separate
from that of the PSC. Id. at 851. Therefore, it found that § 482's two trade or business re-
quirements was not satisfied. It distinguished cases such as Borge v. Commissioner, 405
F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969), and Ach v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d
342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966), which had applied § 482 to reallocate income
between a corporation and its shareholder, saying that such cases involved situations in
which the shareholder was actually carrying on a business separate from that of the cor-
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The Tax Court's decision in Keller v. Commissioner'36 foreshadowed
the application of section 482 in Foglesong. Keller, a pathologist, was a
partner in Medical Arts Laboratory (MAL), a general partnership com-
posed of several pathologists. MAL rendered pathology services to
hospitals and physicians. MAL received its technical and laboratory sup-
port from Medical Arts Laboratory, Inc. (MAL, Inc.), while MAL provid-
ed quality control and superYisory services to MAL, Inc. All of the MAL
partners were shareholders and directors of MAL, Inc.'
Keller formed a PSC, Keller, Inc. Keller was the sole shareholder,
director, and employee. Keller, Inc. adopted a tax qualified retirement
plan and a medical reimbursement plan. An agreement between Keller
and MAL substituted Keller, Inc. as a partner in MAL. Thereafter,
Keller, Inc. received Keller's prior share of the income that the partner-
ship earned. Keller, Inc. paid Keller an annual salary for his services."
On alternative grounds, the Commissioner sought to tax Keller
directly on the income Keller, Inc. received. First, under section 61, the
Commissioner sought to hold Keller liable based on the doctrines of lack
of business purpose, substance-over-form, and assignment of income.'39
In response to the Commissioner's lack of business purpose and substance-
over-form arguments, the court refused to deem efforts to obtain the
advantages of qualified retirement and medical plans by conducting
business in the corporate form sufficient to render the taxpayer
culpable of illegitimate tax avoidance. The court ignored the issue of
whether the desire to obtain these benefits comprises a business pur-
pose since Keller, Inc. did in fact engage in business activity, ie.,
medical services. "" The court reached this conclusion despite the facts
that Keller, Inc. had the same offices as MAL and MAL, Inc., did not
pay rent, did not purchase or own property, and did not employ
anyone but Keller and Keller's wife. The court also refused to accept
the Commissioner's assignment of income argument. The court decided
that the assignment of income doctrine, if successful, would render
Keller, Inc. a nullity for federal income tax purposes, a result inconsis-
tent with the policy favoring the recognition of corporations as entities
independent of their shareholders.'
poration, or in which a taxpayer was attempting to shift losses from one business to
another. Id. at 851-52. The issue of whether being an employee of one's controlled PSC con-
stitutes a separate trade or business under § 482 is by no means settled, however, since the
Tax Court clearly took the opposite position in Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981)
which is currently on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. See 2 ABA Section of Taxation, Newslet-
ter No. 2, at 10 (Winter 1983).
77 T.C. 1014 (1981).
"' Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1016-17.
" Id. at 1021.
,o Id. at 1023-24.
.,. Id. at 1031.
[Vol. 40:433
PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS
Under section 482, the Commissioner sought to allocate to Keller one
hundred percent of the income which Keller, Inc. reported. The court
held that being an employee of one's own PSC constitutes a separate
trade or business and, consequently, it could apply section 482 in the
one person PSC situation."' The court nevertheless found that the
Commissioner's attempt to shift all of Keller, Inc.'s income to Keller
under section 482 was arbitrary and capricious.' The standard the
court used in testing the employment arrangement was whether both
Keller, Inc. and Keller would have entered into their financial relation-
ship if they had been unrelated parties dealing at arm's length. The
court inquired whether the total compensation Keller, Inc. paid Keller
(including salary, pension plan contributions, and medical expense
reimbursements) was substantially equivalent to what Keller would
have received absent incorporation. '44
A strongly worded dissent," in which six judges joined, rejected
the majority's quantification-of-compensation approach. The dissent
pointed out that Keller's PSC was basically a paper entity. The PSC
owned no medical supplies, office furniture, or technical medical equip-
ment. The corporation employed neither medical technicians nor
nurses. To the dissenters, the corporation was nothing more than a
bank account through which the taxpayer's income was funneled. As a
result, "the attenuated subtleties triumph over economic substance
and practical reality, and form and artifice reclaims center stage of our
tax laws." ' The dissenters in Keller feared that "[a]fter this decision,
anyone may form a corporation, paper the file a little, and market his
services with his salary being paid to his corporation."'4 7 The dissenting
opinion concluded with a ringing defense of the assignment of income
doctrine and took issue with the Second Circuit opinion in Rubin,
which the dissenters believed dealt cavalierly with a fundamental
principle in income taxation.148
The competing concepts of the assignment of income doctrine and
the recognition of a corporation as a separate earning entity illustrate
how courts fashion compromise from conflict. Judicial resort to section
482 in the PSC area exemplifies the manner in which courts reconcile in-
consistent premises. Conceptually, the assignment of income doctrine
can operate to tax a sole shareholder-employee on the income his PSC
purportedly earns despite the fact that a corporation generally is a
separate taxpaying entity. In Lucas v. Earl,' the government did not
'4, Id. at 1022-24.
,, Id. at 1025.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1035 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 1039.
147 Id.
,,' Id. at 1043-44.
" 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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contend that Mrs. Earl had no legal existence as a separate taxpaying
entity. Rather, the Court simply held that Mrs. Earl did not earn the in-
come that her husband assigned to her."' Nevertheless, courts have
often been reluctant to apply the assignment of income doctrine in PSC
cases for fear of eroding the idea of the corporation's separate existence
for tax purposes. The use of section 482 in cases involving one-person
PSC's constitutes a judicial compromise in recognition of the competing
concepts of the assignment of income doctrine and the corporation's ex-
istence as a separate entity that can earn its own income. By applying
section 482, courts are able to respect the corporate entity as a distinct
earner while simultaneously allocating income from the corporation to
its controlling shareholder-employee.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE PSC AFTER TEFRA
In recognizing that a corporation can earn its own income, courts
have used the compromise measure of section 482 to limit the assign-
ment of income to PSC's. Once courts decided that section 482 could
preempt section 61 and the assignment of income doctrine, the results in
many of the PSC cases seemed to have turned on whether the taxpayer
operated the PSC in connection with a "good" or "bad" tax avoidance
motive. In many cases where the taxpayer successfully avoided the
reallocation of income under section 482, the principal purpose underly-
ing incorporation appeared to be securing the permissible benefit of a
corporate deferred compensation plan. Conversely, in many cases when
the taxpayer was unsuccessful in avoiding reallocation, the taxpayer
created the PSC primarily for "bad" motives such as to split income or
utilize losses.
151
In the future, however, taxpayers in many cases will be unable to
use a legitimate tax avoidance motive to avoid reallocation of corporate
income to shareholder-employees. Not only does TEFRA eliminate the
incremental advantage of a corporate deferred compensation plan,'52 but
the addition of section 269A to the Code by TEFRA5 3 no longer
recognizes the favorable tax treatment of PSC's and their shareholder-
employees as a permissible justification for recognizing the PSC as a
true earner of income.
Section 269A provides that the IRS, under certain circumstances,
may allocate all income and deductions between "a personal service cor-
poration" and its "employee-owners" if such allocation is necessary to
" Id. at 114.
... Compare Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968) (principal motive of in-
corporation apparently to offset personal service income with corporate losses) with Keller
v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981) (a principal motive of incorporation apparently to ob-
tain tax benefits of employee pension plan).
112 TEFRA §§ 235(a), 238.
5 Id. § 250.
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prevent avoidance or evasion of federal income tax. Before the IRS can
allocate income and deductions under section 269A, two conditions must
be met. First, substantially all of the services of the personal service cor-
poration must be performed for (or on behalf of) one other corporation,
partnership, or other entity. Second, the principal purpose for forming
the personal service corporation must be the avoidance or evasion of
federal income tax by benefitting any employee-owner in a manner not
otherwise available without a corporation. The House-Senate Con-
ference Agreement, out of which section 269A was reported, stated that
"the conferees intended that the provisions overturn the results reached
in cases like Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), where the cor-
poration serves no meaningful business purpose other than to secure tax
benefits which would not otherwise be available." '54By virture of the reduced marginal benefits available to incor-
porated service-providers, the enactment of TEFRA likely will decrease
the number of PSC's incorporated in the future. To the extent that in-
dividuals desire to form PSC's notwithstanding these reduced benefits,
however, the question remains whether courts will subject service-
providers who incorporate to a more stringent test under section 269A
than courts in the past applied under section 482 and the assignment of
income doctrine. While section 482 addresses whether evasion of taxes
or a distortion of income occurred, section 269A permits reallocation if
the principal purpose of a PSC is the avoidance of federal tax.
Despite the ostensibly more expansive reach of section 269A with its
"tax avoidance" language, the impact of section 269A on existing law
probably will be minimal due to TEFRA's establishing parity between
the retirement plans available for employees and self-employed in-
dividuals. Precisely because the principal purpose for the incorporation
of service-providers had been to take advantage of the more attractive
corporate deferred compensation plans, the elimination of this benefit
will mean that the nontax benefits of incorporating will assume greater
significance in the decision whether to incorporate. As a consequence of
the enhanced importance of the nontax aspects of incorporating, the Ser-
vice will have more difficulty persuading a fact-finder that the principal
purpose of forming a PSC was to avoid federal income tax. In those cases
where, for example, obvious income-splitting constitutes the motivation
for incorporating a service-provider, section 61 and the assignment of in-
come doctrine-even under pre-TEFRA law-would operate to
reallocate the income properly. Thus, even when the personal service
corporation performs substantially all of its services for another entity,
section 269A is unlikely to have much impact beyond the present reach
of sections 61 and 482.
Section 269A thus illustrates why attempts at a complete statutory
'" H. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 634 (1982).
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resolution of any tax problem are likely to be deficient. As the history of
the tax law amply demonstrates, attempts to legislate general prin-
ciples, such as the assignment of income doctrine, inevitably challenge
the ingenuity of tax advisors to devise ways to avoid the strictures of
the statute. Due to the dynamics of tax law evolution and its present
state in the PSC area, further change is unavoidable.
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